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ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW-HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES DEPART-

MENT'S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES MUST EXPLAIN NOT ONLY WHY
THEY CREDIT EVIDENCE
FOR SOCIAL SECURITY

IN DETERMINING DISABILITY CLAIMS
BENEFITS, BUT ALSO WHY THEY

REJECT EVIDENCE IN DETERMINING SUCH CLAIMS.

Cotter v. Harris(3d Cir. 1981)
Daniel P. Cotter, a fifty-seven year-old welder,' filed a claim for
disability benefits pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act
(Act),2 and for supplemental security income benefits pursuant to
Title XVI of the Act.8 The primary basis for Cotter's claim of dis4
ability was a heart condition.
Following the Secretary of Health and Human Services' (Secretary)
denial of disability benefits, 5 Cotter was provided with a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).6

After hearing conflicting

1. Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 702, reh. denied, 650 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.
1981). Cotter was 57 years old on June 21, 1978, the alleged date of the
disability. Id. He had worked for at least the past 15 years as a welder of

heavy equipment. Id.
2. Id. at 701. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i)(1)(A), 423(d)(1)(A) (1976). These
sections provide, in pertinent part, that for the purposes of claiming disability
under this Title the term "disability" means an "inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or has lasted or

can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." Id.
3. 642 F.2d at 701. See 42 U.S.C. § 1381a (1976). Section 1381a provides
that "[e]very aged, blind, or disabled individual who is determined under
part A [of this Title] to be eligible on the basis of his income and resources
shall, in accordance with and subject to the provisions of this subchapter, be
paid benefits by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare." Id.
4. 642 F.2d at 702. Cotter had a history of frequent premature ventricular
contractions (PVC), and was taking medication for this condition. Id. His
application for benefits also alleged disability as a result of diplopia (double
vision), which was caused by a work accident. Id. at 702 n.2. Cotter's application for benefits also alleged disability because of a mental impairment.
Id.
5. Id. at 701. Benefits were denied initially, and again upon reconsideration. Id. For a discussion of how disability benefit claim eligibility is determined within the Social Security Administration, see note 24 and accompanying
text infra.
6. Id. at 701-02. Cotter was represented by counsel at the hearing. Id.
In connection with his disability claim, Cotter had previously filed a work
activity report which stated that he last worked as a welder of heavy equipment
in the coal stripping industry, and that such work required "frequent exposure
to fumes and dust," "occasional lifting of from 21 to 50 pounds, [and] carrying
a 50 pound box 50 feet to a truck." Id. at 702. At the hearing before the
ALJ, Cotter also testified that this job sometimes required dragging 100 pound
tanks. Id.
The work activity report also stated that from 1970 to 1976
Cotter had welded road construction equipment, which required lifting from
50 to 100 pounds, and carrying these weights 10 feet. Id.

(1265)
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evidence from three doctors, 7 the ALJ denied Cotter's application,
finding that he was not disabled within the meaning of the Act because
he still had the physical capacity to work as a welder. 8 This decision
was subsequently approved by the Appeals Council of the Social Security Administration.9
Cotter then filed suit in the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, seeking review of the decision denying him
benefits. 10 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
the Secretary."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit 12 vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the Secretary, holding that the ALJ must state on the record the reasons for his
findings and, in particular, must explain his implicit rejection of evidence that supported the disability claim. Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d
700 (3d Cir. 1981).
7. Id. at 702-03. Dr. Baltazor Corcino, an internist and Cotter's physician
since July of 1975, found that Cotter's electrocardiogram (ECG) showed frequent PVCs with a bigeminal pattern. Id. at 702. In two medical reports,
dated June 30, 1978 and September 28, 1978, Dr. Corcino diagnosed Cotter as
having arteriosclerotic heart disease. Id. at 703. On March 8, 1978 and
March 28, 1978, Dr. Corcino reported his conclusion that Cotter was unable
to work. Id. Dr. William Kimber, a specialist with the Department of
Cardiovascular Medicine at Geisinger Medical Center performed initial tests
on Cotter, and his report, dated October 9, 1978, stated his "impression" of
"Ventricular premature beats-rule[s] out associated cardiac disease." Id. A
further examination of Cotter, including a treadmill exercise ECG, led Dr.
Kimber to report on October 25, 1978 that Cotter had ventricular tachycardia,
a significant rhythm disturbance of the heart, during the test. Id. In two
medical reports, dated October 25, 1978 and March 6, 1979, Dr. Kimber
recommended that Cotter not engage in work that entailed physical labor. Id.
In contrast to Dr. Corcino's and Dr. Kimber's diagnosis and recommendations were the conclusions of Dr. Tito Trinidad, an internist who performed
a consultative examination in the Fall of 1978. Id. Dr. Trinidad administered a series of ECGs, including a two-step exercise ECG on October 18, 1978,
and performed. a physical capacity evaluation on October 16, 1978. Id.
Trinidad also estimated that Cotter had the ability to frequently lift from 21
to 50 pounds, occasionally lift from 51 to 100 pounds, and to frequently bend,
squat, crawl, and climb. Id. This report did not indicate the clinical tests
or observations, if any, on which this evaluation was based. Id.
8. Id. at 703. The ALJ found that, although Cotter had an "occasional
premature ventricular heart beat," he still had "the physical capacity to
perform his past customary work as a welder." Id. The ALJ also found that
Cotter's double vision had subsided soon after the accident and, therefore,
could not be considered as a basis for a disability claim. Id. at 702 n.2. Cotter
(lid not contest this ruling. Id. Furthermore, the ALJ found that although
Cotter suffered from depressive neurosis, he was not sufficiently disabled by the
condition. Id.
9. Id. at 702.
10. Id. Cotter filed in the district court pursuant to §§ 2 05 (g) and 1631
(c)(3) of the Social Security Act. Id. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4 05(g), 1383(c)(3) (1976).
11. Id. at 702.
12. The case was heard by Judges Adams, Garth, and Sloviter. Judge
Sloviter wrote the majority opinion. Judge Garth wrote a separate opinion,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
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The Social Security Act (Act) is divided into various subchapters
which cover a wide range of programs including an old-age, survivors,
and disability insurance program and a supplemental security income
13
program.
The Social Security Administration (SSA) administers the Disability Insurance Benefits Program under Title II of the Act and the
Supplemental Security Income Benefits Program under Title XVI of
the Act. 14 Eligibility for benefits under Title I and Title XVI requires that a claimant be disabled within the meaning of the Act.' 5
13. Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935). For provisions pertaining to the old-age survivors, and disability insurance benefits, see 42 U.S.C.
§§401-432 (1976). For provisions relating to supplemental security income
benefits, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1384 (1976). See also 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-306 (1976)
(Grants to States For Old-Age Assistance And Medical Assistance For The
Aged); 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-432 (1976) (Federal Old-Age, Survivors, And Disability
Insurance Benefits); 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-504 (1976) (Grants To States For Unemployment Compensation Administration); 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-660 (1976) (Grants
To States For Aid And Services To Needy Families With Children And For
Child-Welfare Services); 42 U.S.C. §§ 701-716 (1976) (Maternal And Child
Health And Crippled Children's Services); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1391-1394 (1976)
(Grants For Planning Comprehensive Action To Combat Mental Retardation);
42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1976) (Health Insurance For The Aged And Disabled); 42
U.S.C. § 1396 (1976) (Grants To States For Medical Assistance Programs).
14. 20 C.F.R. § 401.110 (1981). Title II of the Social Security Act is
codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-432 (1976). Title XVI of the Social Security Act
is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1834 (1976). Title II of the Act provides retirement, survivors, and disability cash benefits for 34.7 million social insurance
beneficiaries at a cost of about $8 billion a year. See Social Security Administration, Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare, Social Security in Review,
42 Soc. SECURITY BULL. 1, 5 (May 1979). Title XVI of the Act provides
monthly cash supplemental security income payments for over four million
needy, aged, blind, and disabled persons. See id. at 1.
For a discussion of the congressional intent in establishing the Disability
Insurance Benefits Program, see Crawford, Judicial Review of Social Security
Disability Provisions, 11 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 215 (1980). This commentator
argues that Congress intended the Title II disability insurance program to
serve two competing interests: I) to alleviate poverty by providing cash benefits
to qualified disabled workers and dependents; and, 2) at the same time, to
provide economic security for potential claimants by maintaining a financially
viable insurance fund. Id. at 244. He suggests that the language of the disability provisions, as well as the congressional history, shows that Congress has
favored a conservative application of such payments. Id. at 244-45. See also
W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE, P. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES AND COIMIENTS
448 (7th ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as C. BysE] (arguing that Congress understood the adverse consequences of using an adversary system for public benefit
programs and intended SSA determinations to be made by "paternalistic
refugees" who are assigned to protect both the public's interest in the disability
trust fund and the claimant's rightful claim to benefits).
For a discussion of the historical background of the creation of the Disability Insurance Benefits Program as an extension of the original Social
Security Old.Age and Survivors' Insurance (OASI) Program, see R. DIXoN,
SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY AND MASS JUSTICE 12-18 (1973).
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A) (1976). The statutory
definition of disability under the Title II Disability Insurance Benefits Program
and under the Title XVI Supplemental Security Income Benefits Program is
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In addition, under Title II, a claimant must be under age 65,16 and
must satisfy a two-part work requirement under the Act in order to
17
obtain the status of a fully insured worker.
Congress authorized the Secretary to promulgate regulations and
to establish a procedural framework for carrying out the purposes of
the disability program.' 8 Specifically, the Secretary was given responnearly the same. See 42 U.S.C. §§416(i), 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A) (1976).
For a definition of disability under §§ 416(i) and 423(d)(1)(A) of Title II, see
note 2 supra. The key to the disability provision under Title II is the meaning
of "substantial gainful activity." Regulations promulgated under the Act define "substantial gainful activity" as work that involves the performance of
significant physical or mental activities, even if it is done on a part-time basis,
or work that involves less activity, less pay, or less responsibility than when
the individual worked before. 20 C.F.R. §404.1572(a) (1981). Gainful work
activity is defined as the kind of work usually done for pay or profit, whether
or not a profit is realized. Id. § 404.1572(b). SSA considers various factors in
determining whether work activity meets the definition of substantial gainful
activity: the nature of work; how well it is performed; if the work is done
under special conditions; if the individual is self-employed; and the time spent
in work. Id. § 404.1573. However, if an individual's earnings exceed a certain
amount per month (e.g., if an individual's earnings averaged more than $300
a month in calendar years after 1979), then this factor alone may be enough to
show that the work constitutes substantial gainful activity. Id. § 404.1574(2)(vi).
The definition of disability also focuses on "physical or mental impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3) (1976). The Act defines this phrase to be "an
impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques." Id.
The Act further narrows the current
definition of disability for workers, providing that a worker must show that the
physical or mental impairment(s) are of such severity that
[h]e is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education and work experience, engage in any other
kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy,
regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which
he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether
he would be hired if he applied for work .......
.[Work which
exists in the national economy" means work which exists in significant
numbers either in the region where such individual lives or in several
regions of the country.
Id. § 423(d)(2).
16. See generally 20 C.F.R. § 404.715 (1981). The claimant must submit
proof of age, when required. Id.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 423(c) (1976).
The claimant must have worked for a
certain duration (i.e., be fully insured). Id. § 423(c)(1)(A). Also, a portion of
claimant's work must have occurred during a certain period immediately preceding the disability (i.e., claimant must have at least 20 quarters of coverage
during the 40-quarter period which ends with the quarter in which the disability began). Id. § 423(c)(l)(B)(i).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 405(a) (1976). Congress provided that the Secretary
[s]hall have full power and authority to make rules and regulations
and to establish procedures . . . necessary or appropriate to carry out
such provisions, and shall adopt reasonable and proper rules and
regulations to regulate and provide for the nature and extent of the
proofs and evidence and the method of taking and furnishing the same
in order to establish the right to benefits hereunder.
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sibility for determining the nature and extent of the evidence necessary to establish a claim of disability, and the method by which such
proof would be furnished. 19 The Secretary acting pursuant to this
broad delegation of regulatory authority placed the burden upon the
20
claimant to prove disability within the meaning of the Act.

In es-

sence, where the claimant is not per se disabled, 21 the claimant has
the burden of submitting evidence that "convincingly" shows that a
disability exists, and that such impairment prevents a return to work
or precludes any substantial gainful employment available in the
national economy.

22

Upon the filing of a disability claim with the SSA, the administrative decision-making and review process is initiated. 2. This process
consists of four stages: 1) "Initial Determination"; 2) "Reconsideration"; 3) "Hearing" before an ALJ; and 4) "Appeals Council Review." 24 The claimant may appeal the final administrative determina19. 42 U.S.C. § 405(a) (1976). Congress mandated that "[a]n individual
shall not be considered to be under a disability unless he furnishes such
medical and other evidence of the existence thereof as the Secretary may
require." 42 U.S.C. at § 423(d)(5). See also note 18 supra.
20. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.704, 404.1512 (1981). These regulations set forth
the claimant's responsibility to submit evidence proving disability. Id.
21. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d) (1981). A per se disability exists when an
individual's impairment(s) meets the duration requirement, and is either listed
in Appendix 1 or is determined to be the medical equivalent of a listed
impairment. Id. If these requirements are met, a finding of disability shall
be made without consideration of the individual's age, education, and work
experience. Id.
22. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.704, 404.1512, 404.708 (1981).
23. See generally 20 C.F.R. § 404.900 (1981).
24. Id. These steps usually must be requested within certain time periods
and in the prescribed order. Id. "Initial Determination" is defined as the
determinations made by the SSA, which state the important facts and the
reasons for the action taken. Id. § 404.902. "Reconsideration" is defined as
the first step in the administrative review process, which is provided by the
SSA if the claimant is dissatisfied with the decision in the initial determination.
Id. § 404.907. During reconsideration, the SSA reviews the evidence used in
making the initial determination and considers any other evidence presented
by the claimant. Id. §404.918. A hearing before an ALJ may be requested
by a claimant who is dissatisfied with the reconsideration determination. Id.
§ 404.900. At the hearing, the claimant may appear in person, submit new
evidence, examine the evidence used in making the decision under review,
and present and question witnesses. Id. § 404.929. The ALJ must make a
complete record of the hearing proceeding and issue a decision based on the
hearing record. Id. § 404.953. Furthermore, the ALJ must issue a written
decision which states the findings of fact and the reasons for the decision. Id.
If any party is dissatisfied with the hearing decision, a request can be made to
the Appeals Council to review that action. Id. §§404.900(4), .967. The
Appeals Council will consider the evidence in the hearing record, and any
additional evidence which it believes is material to the issues being considered.
Id. § 404.976(b). The Appeals Council may deny or dismiss the request for
review, or it may grant the request and either render a decision or remand
the case to the ALJ to receive additional evidence. Id. § 404.967. When these
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tion to a federal court. 25 However, the Act narrowly limits the
20
When a court enpermissible scope of subsequent judicial review.
any findings of
decision,
administrative
an
gages in judicial review of
if
supported by
fact by the Secretary must be accepted as conclusive
"substantial evidence." 27 This "substantial evidence" test has traditionally delineated the scope of judicial review in federal administrative
28
agency proceedings.
four steps of the administrative review process are completed, the SSA will
have made its final decision. Id. § 404.900(5).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1976). A claimant may appeal the final administrative determination to the federal district court in the district in which he
resides. Id. The Act provides that the federal district court has jurisdiction,
irrespective of the amount in controversy, with power to affirm, modify, or
reverse the decision of the Secretary, but requires the district court to act as a
court of review. Id. The judgment of the district court is final and binding
upon the parties unless the decision is appealed to a federal court of appeals
in the same manner as any other civil action. Id. § 405(h).

26. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (1976).
0
27. 42 U.S.C. §405(g) (1976). Section 4 5(g) provides:
The findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive, and where a claim has been
denied by the Secretary . . . because of failure of the claimant or
such individual to submit proof in conformity with any regulation
prescribed under subsection (a) of this section, the court shall review
only the question of conformity with such regulation and the validity

of such regulations.
Id.

28. See ICC v. Union Pacific R.R., 222 U.S. 541 (1912). In Union Pacific
R.R., the substantial evidence rule was first discussed by the Supreme Court
in connection with federal court review of an administrative agency decision.
Id. at 548. According to one commentator, "[f]rom that time to the present,
the substantial evidence rule has been the touchstone for review of agency
fact-findings." B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW § 210, at 592 (1976). For
the Court's analysis of what the substantial evidence test means, see, e.g.,
Illinois C.R.R. v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 385 U.S. 57, 69 (1966) (substantial
evidence rule means that reviewing court must not reweigh evidence nor
become concerned with the agency's reasoning or with the wisdom of its
decisions); Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 619-20 (1966)
(substantial evidence is that amount of evidence which would justify, if the

trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict); Universal Camera Corp. v.

NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951) (substantial evidence rule requires a reviewing
court to look to the record as a whole). See also B. SCHWARTZ, supra at 596
(substantial evidence test is a test of reasonableness, not of the rightness of
agency findings of fact).
The Supreme Court also has indicated that the substantial evidence test
imposes some requirements upon the administrative agency. SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943). Specifically, the Court stated: "The orderly
functioning of the review process requires that the grounds upon which the
administrative agency acted be clearly disclosed and adequately sustained." Id.
But see Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (rejection of a reviewing court's imposition of
procedural requirements).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol27/iss6/6

6

Kramer: Administrative Law - Health and Human Services Department's Admin

1981-82]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

1271

29
In Richardson v. Perales,
the Supreme Court specifically dealt
with the question of substantial evidence in the context of social security disability proceedings. 80 The Court interpreted substantial evidence to mean "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion."31
The Perales Court

held that written reports by non-testifying physicians who examined
the claimant may constitute substantial evidence supporting a denial
32
of benefits.
In utilizing the substantial evidence test to define the scope of

judicial review in a social security disability proceeding, the courts of
appeals have traditionally accorded much deference to the Secretary's
decisions.3 3 However, a recent willingness by some circuits to assume
29. 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
30. 402 U.S. at 402. In Perales, the claimant, aged 35, asserted that he
became disabled as a result of an injury to his back sustained in lifting an
object at work. Id. at 390. At the disability hearing, medical evidence in
the form of reports of five doctors who had once examined the claimant were
admitted into evidence, even though the doctors were not present to testify or
be subject to cross-examination. Id. at 395. In denying benefits, the ALJ
relied on this hearsay evidence to find that the claimant was not disabled.
Id. at 396. On appeal, the claimant contended that this hearsay evidence
could not by itself constitute substantial evidence in light of the claimant's
testimony and the in-person testimony of medical witnesses which contradicted
the reports. Id. at 399.
31. 402 U.S. at 401, citing Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S.
197, 229 (1938). For cases dealing with the meaning of the substantial evidence
test, see note 28 supra.
32. 402 U.S. at 390. The Court held that such hearsay evidence may
constitute substantial evidence when the claimant has not exercised his right to
subpoena the reporting physicians and thereby provide himself with a chance
for cross-examination. Id. at 409-10. For other cases in which the claimant
was denied disability benefits and in which the Supreme Court discussed SSA
procedures for determining denial, decrease, or termination of disability benefits, see Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979) (lack of prerecoupment oral
hearing in overpayment cases); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (evidentiary hearing is necessary before termination of disability insurance benefits); Richardson v. Wright, 405 U.S. 208 (1972) (challenge to procedures
employed in suspension or termination of disability benefits).
33. See, e.g., Johnson v. Harris, 625 F.2d 311 (9th Cir. 1980) (reviewing
court is limited to determining whether findings of relevant fact are supported
by substantial evidence); Warncke v. Harris, 624 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1980)
(reviewing court may not reweigh evidence or substitute its judgment for
that of Secretary even if it finds that evidence preponderates against Secretary's
decision). Accord, Ginter v. Secretary of Health, Educ. and Welfare, 621 F.2d
313 (8th Cir. 1980); Bradley v. Califano, 573 F.2d 28 (10th Cir. 1978); Allen v.
Weinberger, 552 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1977); Ingram v. Richardson, 471 F.2d 1268
(6th Cir. 1972). For a discussion of the courts of appeals' use of the substantial evidence test in social security disability proceedings, see generally
B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 28, §210; R. DixoN, supra note 14, at 93-102.
Professor Schwartz observes that the value of administrative agencies is their
expertise and knowledge in complicated fields, and that judicial deference to
agency decisions arises out of concern that this benefit would be undermined
by judicial interference.
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a more active role in reviewing administrative agency decisions, 84 has
led to new requirements which prescribe when the Secretary's factfindings in a disability benefits case are sufficient to meet the substantial
evidence test.8 5 Three circuits have, in fact, refused to uphold the
Secretary's findings of no disability where the Secretary had failed to
state on the record what evidence was considered, what weight it re36
ceived, and why it was rejected.
The Fourth Circuit has been especially stringent in its demand
for specific findings by the Secretary.8 7 In King v. Califano,8s the
claimant's application for black lung benefits under the Federal Coal
34. See, e.g., Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C.

Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971). The Greater Boston court stated
that the reviewing court must intervene "if the court becomes aware . . .that
the agency has not really taken a 'hard look' at the salient problems, and has
Id. at 851 (footnote
not genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-making."
omitted). Further, the court found that a "collaborative spirit [between the
court and agency] does not undercut, it rather underlines the court's rigorous
insistence on the need for conjunction of articulated standards and reflective
findings, in furtherance of even-handed application of law." Id. at 852. See
also Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971),
where the court pronounced that judicial review is now at a watershed:
We stand on the threshold of a new era in the history of the long
and fruitful collaboration of administrative agencies and reviewing
courts. For many years, courts have treated administrative policy
decision with great deference, confining judicial attention primarily
to matters of procedure. On matters of substance, the courts regularly
upheld agency action, with a nod in the direction of the "substantial
evidence" test, and a bow to the mysteries of administrative expertise.
[C]ourts are increasingly asked to review administrative action
that touches on fundamental personal interests in life, health, and
liberty. These interests have always had a special claim to judicial
protection ...
To protect these interests from administrative arbitrariness, it is
necessary . . . to insist on strict judicial scrutiny of administrative
action. . . . Courts should require administrative officers to articulate
the standards and priniciples that govern their discretionary decisions
in as much detail as possible.
Id. at 597-98 (footnotes omitted). Other circuits have cited this language
with approval. See Silva v. Secretary of Labor, 518 F.2d 301, 311 (1st Cir.
1975); United States v. Barbera, 514 F.2d 294, 302-04 (2d Cir. 1975), Morales v.
Schmidt, 489 F.2d 1335, 1348-49 (7th Cir. 1973) (Stevens, J., dissenting). For
a discussion of the benefits of increased judicial scrutiny of administrative
agency decisions, see Leventhal, Principled Fairness and Regulatory Urgency,
25 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 66, 70 (1974); K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 2.00 (Supp. 1976); K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 57-59, 103-06 (1969).
35. For a discussion of new requirements imposed by courts of appeals on
the Secretary's fact-finding in a disability proceeding, see notes 37-64 and

accompanying text infra.
36. Id.

37. For a discussion of Fourth Circuit cases which have reversed and remanded the Secretary's denial of disability benefits because the substantial
evidence test had not been met, see notes 38-48 and accompanying text infra.
38. 615 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1980).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol27/iss6/6

8

Kramer: Administrative Law - Health and Human Services Department's Admin

1981-82]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

1273

Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 was denied by the Secretary.3 9
The claimant's medical evidence consisted of x-ray studies which four
40
physicians interpreted as supporting the claim of respiratory disease.
However, the ALJ relied on another physician's assessment that the
x-rays were unreadable or negative.4 ' The Fourth Circuit reversed

and remanded the denial of benefits, holding that the ALJ must explain on the record the reasons for rejecting relevant evidence which
42
supported the claim.
Similarly, in Myers v. Califano,43 a case involving disability insurance benefits under Title II, the Fourth Circuit held that the
Appeals Council's failure to make specific findings in regard to a
psychiatric report submitted by plaintiff was reversible error. 44 The
39. Id. at 1018. The claimant filed a disability benefit claim under the
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 30 U.S.C. § 901 (1976).
615 F.2d at 1019. Pursuant to § 923(b), which incorporates by reference the
Social Security Act, the Secretary must utilize the same personnel and procedures
in determining entitlement to disability insurance benefits under the Federal
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 as it does under Title II disability
insurance benefits cases. 30 U.S.C. § 923(b) (1976). For a discussion of the
personnel and procedures utilized in disability benefits cases, see notes 23-25
supra.
40. 615 F.2d at 1019. These four physicians interpreted the x-ray data as
showing the existence of pneumoconiosis. Id. In addition, two physicians
gave claimant physical examinations and concluded that he suffered from
occupational pneumoconiosis. Id. There was also testimony that claimant had
symptoms of lung impairment (e.g., shortness of breath, coughing, and
fatigue). Id.
41. Id. at 1020. In evaluating the evidence, the Secretary stated that no
medical expert who was officially certified in radiology had read claimant's
x-ray films as showing a lung impairment. Id. at 1019. However, the court
noted that the record revealed that three out of the four physicians who
found such a showing were officially certified readers. Id. at 1019-20.
42. Id. at 1020. The court noted that the Secretary's decision did not
give proper treatment to the findings of two of the physicians who examined
claimant and diagnosed pneumoconiosis. Id. After stating that the court
places great reliance on the conclusions of a claimant's examining physician,
the court concluded that the Secretary had "apparently, impermissibly limited
his findings to those based on objective medical tests." Id. Furthermore, the
court found that the Secretary had ignored a Circuit rule that contradictory
x-ray readings benefit neither party. Id. In concluding that the Secretary
had committed reversible error, the court held that the Secretary must consider
all the evidence and state on the record how he treated the evidence of these
two examining physicians. Id.
43. 611 F.2d 980 (4th Cir. 1980).
44. Id. at 983. The claimant had worked as a welder and on an assembly line
prior to her application for disability insurance benefits because of back injuries.
Id. at 982. One physician and one chiropractor diagnosed her condition as
acute with disabling pain, while another physician found her orthopedic condition to be essentially normal, but noted her persistent complaints of pain.
Id. The ALJ refused to give any weight to the evidence of pain, holding
that under the regulations an impairment must be demonstrable by objective
medical evidence. Id. at 983. The court reversed and remanded, stating that
the ALJ must consider whether pain had a disabling effect. Id. Further, the

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1982

9

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 6 [1982], Art. 6

1274

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 27: p. 1265

court concluded that the Secretary must indicate explicitly on the
record the weight given to all relevant evidence. 45 Most recently, in
Walker v. Harris,46 the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded a denial
of supplemental security income benefits because the ALJ's opinion
lacked specific detail. 47 The court stated that the ALJ's record should
have contained a discussion of the claimant's former job duties and
should have addressed the potential side effects of the claimant's many
48
medications.
The Ninth Circuit has also indicated its support for requiring
the Secretary to make more specific findings before it will consider the
substantial evidence test to be fulfilled. 49 In Walker v. Mathews,50
claimant presented uncontradicted medical evidence to show that he
could no longer work as a stevedore because of a severe back injury.51
The Secretary's subsequent denial of disability benefits was reversed and
remanded by the court, which held that when an ALJ rejects uncontradicted medical opinions, the ALJ must "expressly state clear and
convincing reasons for doing sO." 52

court noted that the Appeals Council must make specific findings concerning a
psychiatric report that claimant submitted after the ALJ decision. Id.
45. Id. The court emphasized that "[u]nless the Secretary explicitly indicates the weight given to all the relevant evidence, we cannot determine on
review whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence."
Id.
(citation omitted).
46. 642 F.2d 712 (4th Cir. 1981).
47. Id. at 714-15. Claimant filed an application for supplemental security benefits because of a variety of medical problems, including hypertension,
diabetes, arthritis, and urinary tract infections. Id. at 713. Claimant, who had
only four years of formal education, was not represented by counsel before
the ALJ, and gave an uninterrupted, rambling monologue. Id. at 714. The
ALJ denied the benefits on the ground that there was no medical evidence to
support the finding that claimant had an impairment which prevented her
from engaging in her former jobs. Id. The court reversed and remanded,
holding that the ALJ's opinion was incomplete since "the (ALJ) failed in her
duty 'scrupulously and conscientiously [to] probe into, inquire of, and explore
for all the relevant facts' in this case involving an unrepresented, poorlyeducated pro se claimant." Id. at 714-15 (citation omitted).
48. Id. at 714-15.
49. See notes 50-52 and accompanying text infra.
50. 546 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1976).
51. Id. at 819. The claimant had filed an application for disability insurance benefits because of a severe back injury that precluded the lifting of
heavy objects as required in his work as a stevedore. Id. The ALJ denied
disability benefits on the basis that there were a "host of jobs" available to
claimant, including stenciling and machine packaging. Id. at 820.
52. Id. at 820, citing Day v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir.
1975). The court criticized the ALJ's conclusion that claimant could work
since this finding was based on the theoretical existence of a few isolated jobs,
and noted that Congress sought to preclude from the disability determination
any consideration of jobs that exist in limited number or in only a few
geographic locations. Id. at 819, citing 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(2)(A); 1967 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3197-98. The court further noted that the ALJ was
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In a recent series of cases, the Third Circuit has carefully scrutinized the Secretary's decisions in disability benefits cases and has insisted upon an articulation of reasons underlying the agency's ultimate
conclusions. 53 In Baerga v. Richardson,54 the court, in dicta, criticized
the ALJ for submitting a four-page summary of the evidence, followed
by cursory findings of fact, without including in the record explicit
statements as to what part of the evidence was accepted or rejected. 55
Subsequently, in Hargenrader v. Califano,56 the court extended this
reasoning in reversing and remanding a denial of benefits where the
ALJ had given only a brief discussion of the evidence. 57 The court
.equally cavalier in considering the evidence as to the nature of Walker's
injury." Id. at 820. After acknowledging that it was not within the reviewing
court's province to judge the credibility of witnesses before the ALJ, and
further that uncontradicted expert opinions on ultimate issues are not binding
on the ALJ, the court emphasized that if the ALJ rejects these he must state
clear and convincing reasons for so doing. Id. The court then reversed and
remanded because the medical testimony in the case was uncontradicted as to
the bona fide nature of the claimant's pain and physical impairment. Id. at
820. It noted that, "[n]onetheless, the [ALJ] offered no explanation for his
rejection of this testimony and his contrary conclusion as to Walker's disability.
Such a conclusion cannot withstand the scrutiny of the substantial evidence
test." Id. (footnote omitted).
53. For a discussion of the development of standards in the Third Circuit
for assessing when the Secretary's findings of fact in disability proceedings constitute substantial evidence, see notes 54-64 and accompanying text infra.
54. 500 F.2d 309 ((3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U. S. 931 (1975). To
support a claim for disability insurance benefits, the claimant submitted medical evidence in the form of x-ray studies and doctor's reports which showed
extensive hip and leg deformities. Id. at 312. The claimant also gave testimony, which was corroborated by his family, that he had severe pain, was
unable to bathe or dress himself, and had trouble sitting, standing, and
walking. Id. In evaluating the claim, the ALJ did not mention this testimony
and did not explain why he chose to accept certain medical evidence and
reject contradictory evidence. Id.
55. Id. at 312. Although the court affirmed the Secretary's decision denying the claim, it stated that the findings in this case needed improvement and,
further, that an administrative decision that a claimant is not eligible for benefits should "be supported by explicit findings of all facts that are essential to
the conclusion of ineligibility." Id. at 313 (citation omitted). The court
stated:
[A]n examiner's findings should be as comprehensive and analytical
as feasible and, where appropriate, should include a statement of subordinate factual foundations on which ultimate factual conclusions
are based, so that a reviewing court may know the basis of the decision. This is necessary so that the court may properly exercise its
responsibility under 42 U.S.C. § 4 05(g) to determine if the Secretary's
decision is supported by substantial evidence. It is incumbent upon
the examiner to make specific findings-the court may not speculate
as to his findings.
Id. (citation omitted).
56. 575 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1978).
57. Id. at 436. The claimant presented medical evidence that established
that he had a skin ailment of unknown origin, which required a regular
dosage of tranquilizers to control. Id. In addition, the claimant's doctor had
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concluded that without specific subordinate findings of fact which
would indicate why certain evidence was rejected by the ALJ, the court
could not exercise its statutory function of review in a meaningful
way. 58 This holding elevated the court's suggestion in Baerga to a
requirement that must be met in order to satisfy the substantial evidence test.59
The Third Circuit followed this new standard in Dobrozvolsky v.
Califano, ° where the court further justified this rule by emphasizing
that the special nature of proceedings for disability benefits dictates
extra care on the part of the agency in developing an administrative
record. 01 The court concluded that a reviewing court could remand a
case to the Secretary for good cause "where relevant, probative and
available evidence was not explicitly weighed in arriving at a decision
on the plaintiff's claim for disability benefits." 62 Further, in Kennedy
3
v. Richardson,6
the Third Circuit recognized that where there is conflicting probative evidence in the record, there is a particularly acute
advised him not to work because of an ulcer, nervousness, and other problems
attributable to the skin condition. Id. Without mentioning in the decision
such significant items of evidence, the ALJ made a finding that the claimant
was not disabled and could perform many types of jobs. Id. at 437.
58. Id. at 436. The court found that its power to require the agency to
make subordinate findings of fact was inherent in its statutory function of
review mandated by § 405(g), and that "[s]uch findings are necessary to make
meaningful a plaintiff's right to the limited review under that section." 575
F.2d at 436 n.3. For a discussion of § 405(g), see notes 25 & 27 and accompanying text supra.
59. 575 F.2d at 438 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). Judge Aldisert characterized
this requirement in Baerga as obiter dictum which had been elevated to a
standard in Hargenrader. Id.

He was critical of this new standard because

it "now is a controlling legal precept of sufficient dignity as to command a
reversal if not followed by a hearing examiner."

Id.

60. 606 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1979). The claimant filed an application for
disability insurance benefits because of a heart condition. Id. at 404. He
presented medical evidence from two physicians that characterized him as
unable to work and also testified that he experienced pain in standing, sitting,
and bending. Id. The ALJ's denial of disability benefits was based on a
vocational expert's testimony that claimant could perform sedentary jobs.
Id. at 408.
61. Id. at 406-07. The court declared that "[a]lthough the burden is upon

the claimant to prove his disability, due regard for the beneficent purposes of
the legislation requires that a more tolerant standard be used in this administrative proceeding than is applicable in a typical suit in a court of record

where the adversary system prevails." Id. at 407, quoting Hess v. Secretary
of HEW, 497 F.2d 837, 840 (3d Cir. 1974). The court found it consistent with
legislative intent that the courts should be lenient with claimants, and that the
Secretary's responsibility to rebut claimant's evidence be strictly construed.
606 F.2d at 407.
62. 606 F.2d 407 (citation omitted). The court reversed and remanded
because the ALJ relied on the vocational expert's conclusory statements of

claimant's physical abilities, and failed to furnish "any explanation regarding
the relative weight and credibility of the evidence before him." Id. at 409.
63. 454 F.2d 376 (3d Cir. 1972).
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need for the Secretary to explain why certain evidence was rejected.64
Against this background, the Cotter court discussed the standards
to be applied in reviewing an administrative decision. 65 The court
first noted that the ALJ has a duty to hear and evaluate all probative
evidence 66 and to produce a written decision containing findings of
fact and a statement of reasons for such findings.6 7 The court stated
that "cogent reasons" existed for mandating that an administrative
decision be accompanied by "a clear and satisfactory explication of the
basis on which it rests." 68 Chief among these reasons was the need
for an appellate court to properly perform its statutory function of
judicial review.6 9 In this context, the court turned to prior decisions
in which the Third Circuit had reviewed administrative decisions on
70
disability claims.
The court found that under its past decisions, an ALJ's findings
"should be as comprehensive and analytical as feasible and, where appropriate, should include a statement of subordinate factual founda64. Id. at 379. The claimant had an extensive medical history of work-

related injuries. Id. at 377. After a second back injury, the claimant filed
for disability insurance benefits and submitted evidence of his past medical
history and recent x-ray reports. Id. at 378. The ALJ's decision to deny
benefits was based on his finding that the plaintiff's claims could not be confirmed by laboratory and clinical tests. Id. Plaintiff then went to a specialist
who examined him and concluded that he could not engage in any gainful
occupation. Id. The Appeals Council made this evidence part of the claimant's record which it had received on appeal, but rejected the additional
evidence without an explanation. Id. The court reversed and remanded the

case to the Secretary to give reasons for rejecting this medical evidence supporting the claim. Id. at 379. See also Smith v. Califano, 637 F. 2d 968 (3d
Cir. 1981) (Secretary's denial of benefits reversed and summary judgment
granted in favor of claimant because ALJ failed to reconcile contrary medical
opinions).
65. 642 F.2d at 704-06.

66. Id. at 704, citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1503(a), 404.1502 (1980) (in deter-

mining whether an impairment in a particular case constitutes a disability, con-

sideration must be given to all the pertinent facts).
67. 642 F.2d at 705. The court stated: "It is significant that both the
Administrative Procedure Act governing administrative adjudications generally

and regulations applicable to decisions of ALJs in disability matters require

that the administrative law judge specify the reasons or basis for the decision."
Id., citing 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (1976); 20 C.F.R. § 404.939 (1980).
68. 642 F.2d at 704. The court noted that in SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318
U.S. 80 (1943), the Supreme Court emphasized that courts cannot exercise their
duty of review unless they are advised of the considerations underlying the
action being reviewed. Id. at 705.
69. Id. at 705. The court also noted that, "[a] statement of reasons or
findings also helps to avoid judicial usurpation of administrative functions,
assures more careful administrative consideration, and helps the parties plan

their cases for judicial review."
§ 16.05 (1958).

Id., citing K. DAvis, 2

AnMINISTaRATIVE LAW

TREATISE

70. For a discussion of cases in which the Third Circuit examined its
statutory function of review in disability determinations, see notes 53-64 and

accompanying text supra.
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tions on which ultimate factual conclusions are based, so that a reviewing court may know the basis for the decision." 71 The Cotter
court interpreted this standard as requiring the ALJ not only to express
the evidence supporting the decision, but also to give some indication

of the evidence which was rejected and an explanation of why it was
rejected. 72 In the absence of such an indication and explanation in
disability decisions, the court stated, "the reviewing court cannot tell
if significant probative evidence was not credited or simply ignored." 73
The Cotter majority felt it necessary to have the ALJ explain
74
on the record why relevant evidence supporting a claim was rejected.
To hold otherwise, they argued, would be to trifurcate the uniform
obligation of an ALJ, which is to provide an adequate record so that a
reviewing court can determine whether the administrative decision is
based on substantial evidence. 75 According to the majority, "substantial evidence" can only be considered as supporting a decision when
it is viewed in relationship to all the other evidence in the record. 70
71. 642 F.2d at 705, quoting Baerga v. Richardson, 500 F.2d 309, 312
(3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 931 (1975). For a discussion of Baerga,
see notes 54-55 and accompanying text supra.
72. 642 F.2d at 705. The court emphasized that this requirement was not
designed to be a derogation of the ALJ's statutory responsibility (under 42
U.S.C. § 405(b) (1976)) to make findings of fact and decisions as to the rights
of individuals applying for benefits. Id. The court further conceded that an
ALJ is required to make credibility choices between conflicting medical evidence, and that, in furtherance of that duty, an ALJ could not be expected
to include medical or scientific analysis beyond the capacity of a non-scientist.
Id.
73. Id. The court sought to make this point clear by giving the following
hypothetical:
[I]f the record contained the evidence of six medical experts, one of
whom supported the claimant and five of whom did not, it would be
of little assistance to our review function were the ALJ merely to
state that s/he credited the one supporting expert because that
evidence adequately demonstrated disability, but failed to either

mention or explain why the evidence of the other five experts was
rejected. In that instance, we would not know whether the evidence
of the five experts was rejected because the ALJ found it lacking in
credibility, irrelevant, or marred by some other defect.
Id. at 706.
74. Id. at 706. The court expressed puzzlement over Judge Garth's objection to having an ALJ explain on the record why relevant evidence supporting a claim was rejected. Id. In particular the court noted that Judge
Garth "agrees that the ALJ must make findings on the basis of 'all the evidence
in the record' and [explain] 'both the evidence supporting his findings and the
reasons for his decision.' " Id.
75. Id. In arguing that Judge Garth's approach would trifurcate the uni-

form obligation of an ALJ the majority stated that it would be difficult "to
separate the obligation to explain why certain evidence has been accepted

from the obligation to explain why other significant probative evidence has
been rejected." Id. For an application of this reasoning, see note 73 supra.
76. 642 F.2d at 706.
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In applying these standards to the facts in the case, the Cotter
court examined Cotter's employment background, including evidence
that his work required heavy lifting and repeated exposure to fumes
and dust. 77 The court paid considerable attention to medical evidence concerning Cotter's heart condition, 7s and noted the sharp
contrast between the medical finding that Cotter could not return to
work involving physical labor, 79 and the medical opinion that he could
return to his previous job.8s In reviewing the ALJ's discussion of the
medical evidence pertaining to the claimant's heart condition, 8 ' the
83
82
court found that the record was incomplete, and revealed confusion.
77. 642 F.2d at 702. For a discussion of Cotter's employment background,
see note 6 and accompanying text supra.
78. 642 F.2d at 702-03. For a detailed discussion of the medical evidence
pertaining to the claimant's heart condition, see note 7 and accompanying
text supra.
79. 642 F.2d at 704. Cotter's personal physician, Dr. Corcino, and a
specialist in cardiovascular medicine, Dr. Kimber, each had concluded that
Cotter was unable to perform his prior job. Id. at 703. For a specific discussion of their reports, see note 7 supra.
80. 642 F.2d at 704. One physician, Dr. Trinidad, performed a consultative examination and concluded that Cotter should be able to go back to
work. Id. at 703. For further discussion of this doctor's report, see note 7
supra.
81. 642 F.2d at 703.
82. Id. at 704. In discussing the evidence submitted by Mr. Cotter, the
court noted that the ALJ failed to mention in his discussion of the evidence
any medical findings or opinions supporting Cotter's claim. Id. The court
stated that Dr. Corcino's opinion that Cotter could not return to work was
entitled to substantial weight because he was Cotter's treating physician. Id.
The court found even more significant the ALJ's failure to mention the findings of Dr. Kimber, a specialist in cardiovascular medicine. Id. Moreover,
the ALJ did not mention the report relating to Cotter's next to last job in
which he indicated he occasionally carried from 51 to 100 pounds. Id. The
court found this evidence relevant because evidence regarding physical labor
in previous welding jobs went to the issue of whether Cotter had an impairment which prevents him from engaging in past relevant work. Id., citing
20 C.F.R. § 404.1503(e) (1980). Furthermore, the court found that Cotter's
response on the work activity report regarding the demands of prior work
corroborated his testimony that welding involved heavy lifting, and, therefore,
that this response was relevant. 642 F.2d at 707.
83. 642 F.2d at 707. The court found that the ALJ's decision was based
on an erroneous construction of Cotter's work activity report. Id. According
to the court, the ALJ had apparently concluded that Cotter's statement that
he occasionally carried from 21 to 50 pounds referred solely to Cotter's carrying
a 50-pound box of welding rods from a truck to the working station. Id.
This interpretation had no support in the record and also meant that the
ALJ apparently rejected as incredible Cotter's uncontradicted testimony that
welding entailed heavy lifting including the dragging of 100 pound tanks. Id.
Furthermore, the court found that the ALJ's discussion of the evidence revealed some confusion over the medical evidence, since the ALJ stated that
the treadmill test administered by Dr. Kimber showed normal results. Id.
The court stated that Dr. Kimber's evaluation could not, in fact, be fairly
characterized as showing normal results. Id. The court was also troubled by
the ALJ's conclusion that Dr. Kimber had ruled out heart disease, since Dr.
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The court concluded that the ALJ's failure to explain his implicit
rejection of the evidence supporting Cotter's claim or even to acknowledge the presence of such evidence was error,8 4 and thus, the case
should be remanded to the ALJ for reconsideration.85
In a separate opinion, Judge Garth agreed with the majority's
decision that the substantial evidence test was not met.86 Judge Garth
disagreed, however, with the requirement that the ALJ provide reasons for rejecting probative evidence.87 While acknowledging that
the ALJ has a duty to consider all the evidence,8 8 Judge Garth would
not require that an ALJ give reasons for rejecting or discrediting conflicting testimony. 89 Judge Garth viewed this as an unprecedented
Kimber's statement to that effect was made before the treadmill ECG test, upon

which the doctor based his ultimate medical findings concerning Cotter's
condition. Id.
84. Id. at 707. The court stated:
Apparently, the ALJ based his ultimate conclusion that Mr. Cotter
could perform his prior job on Dr. Trinidad's report and evaluation.
Significantly, the ALJ gave no reason for implicitly rejecting the
obviously probative and significant but conflicting findings and conclusions of Drs. Kimber and Corcino, which the ALJ failed to discuss.
Id. at 704.
85. Id. at 707. The court concluded that the ALJ had not considered all

the relevant evidence of record, and more significantly, had misconstrued the
evidence considered, so that the conclusion that Cotter's impairment did not
prevent the performance of his past relevant work must be reconsidered. Id.

Upon reconsideration, the court stated that the ALJ might take additional
evidence, if he deemed it necessary in his discretion.

Id.

The court noted,

in conclusion, that the ALJ should reconsider whether Cotter's evidence was
sufficient to support a determination that Cotter's heart condition, either
alone or in conjunction with his mental impairment, would preclude Cotter
from performing his past relevant work. Id. at 708.
86. 642 F.2d at 708 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Judge Garth agreed with the majority finding that there was not substantial
evidence in the record to support the Secretary's finding that Cotter could

perform his former job as a welder. Id.
87. Id. For the majority's view as to why an ALJ must provide reasons
for rejecting probative evidence, see notes 73-75 and accompanying text supra.
88. Id. Judge Garth interpreted this duty to mean that an ALJ must
indicate the evidence that was rejected or acknowledge that there was conflicting evidence. Id. For the majority's interpretation of this duty, see
note 66 and accompanying text supra.
89. Id. Judge Garth characterized the majority opinion as really imposing
three additional requirements: "that an ALJ: (1) not only furnish an expression of the evidence supporting his result, but also indicate that evidence
which he has rejected . . . ; (2) explain 'the reason why probative evidence
has been rejected' . . . ; and (3) 'explain his implicit rejection of [conflicting]

evidence'...." Id. Judge Garth specifically rejected the second and third
additional requirements and depicted these as mandating that an ALJ make
reciprocal negative findings and give explanations for rejecting evidence.
Id. at 709 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). To clarify
this point he stated:

[T]he majority would now require that an ALJ who has identified
the evidence in the record which he credits and which support his
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extension of prior circuit law,90 and contended that such a requirement
was improper because it was not mandated by the Act.91
It is submitted that the Cotter court's holding manifests a broader
interpretation of the scope of judicial review in a disability proceeding
than that mandated under the Social Security Act.92 The express
language of the Act gives the Secretary the full authority to establish
rules and procedures for a determination of disability benefits, 93 and
the Secretary has not included in these comprehensive rules a requirement that an ALJ indicate in the record why certain evidence was
rejected. 94 In fact, neither the Code of Federal Regulations, nor the
Administrative Procedure Act, which were relied upon by the Cotter
court, 95 can be utilized to support the majority's imposition of this
duty on the ALJ, since these regulations state only that an ALJ must
findings, and who has explained the reasons for his findings, must now
also explain why he has discredited or rejected conflicting testimony.
[A]s I understand the Congressional directive under which we
operate, once we are satisfied that substantial evidence exists to
support a particular finding, e.g., that an accident occurred on
Tuesday, January 6, 1981, the ALJ need not furnish us with findings
or reasons why the accident did not occur on Monday, January 5, or
Wednesday, January 7.
Id. (emphasis supplied).
90. Id. at 710. Judge Garth disagreed with the majority view that the
standard set forth in Hargenrader required reciprocal negative findings or
explanations for rejecting evidence. Id. Judge Garth instead recognized the
additional requirement in Hargenrader as requiring an ALJ to furnish subordinate factual foundations for affirmative findings made by the ALJ, and,
therefore, distinguished this as a much different requirement from those set
forth by the majority. Id. For a further discussion of Hargenrader,see notes
56-58 and accompanying text supra.
91. 642 F.2d at 708 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Judge Garth stated:
[M]y sole objection to the majority opinion is that it attempts to
depart from the standard which Congress has specified in 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g) governing our scope of review. As a court of appeals, we
"are authorized only to adjudicate a specific case or controversy; . . .
we are not entrusted with the rule-making authority." . . . I do not
find any authority in our circuit which requires that an ALJ explain
his reasons for rejecting probative evidence, and certainly the statute
itself does not so require. . . . I believe that it is Congress that must
establish the standard for review of agency action; such is not the
function of the courts.
Id. at 711-12 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
92. For a discussion of the scope of judicial review, see notes 25-27 and
accompanying text supra.
93. For a discussion of the Secretary's authority, see notes 18-20 and
accompanying text supra.
94. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.953 (1981). This provision sets forth the items an
ALJ must include on the record in a decision. For a discussion of this provision, see note 24 supra.
95. For the court's discussion of these regulations, see note 67 and
accompanying text supra.
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make relevant findings and supply reasons for a decision. 96 It is suggested that this lack of specific authority forced the Cotter majority
to infer the imposition of such an obligation on the ALJ from the
97
court's statutory function of review of administrative decisions.
It is submitted that the Cotter court's use of the substantial evidence test to infer the right to impose this additional requirement on
the ALJ is clearly not supported by the Supreme Court, 98 and is in fact
inconsistent with that Court's interpretation of the scope of judicial
review in an administrative proceeding.9 9 However, this use of the
96. For a discussion of the findings which must be made, see note 24
supra. See also 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (1976). This section of the Administrative
Procedure Act states that "[ajll decisions . . . are a part of the record and
shall include a statement of-(A) findings and conclusions, and the reasons or
basis therefor, on all the material issues of fact, law, or discretion presented
on the record .... ." Id. § 557(c)(3)(A).
97. See 642 F.2d at 705. The court acknowledged that the Social Security
Act does not expressly place the obligation on the ALJ to give reasons for
rejecting evidence. Id. at 706. However, the court found the authority to
impose such obligation on the ALJ as "one fairly inferable from [its] statutory
obligation of review." Id. The court justified this inference by reasoning that
"[i]t is difficult to separate the obligation to explain why certain evidence has
been accepted from the obligation to explain why other significant probative
evidence has been rejected." Id. This inference arises from what the court
saw as essentially a uniform obligation of the ALJ, which is to give an adequate
basis for its decision so that a reviewing court can determine whether the
administrative decision is based on substantial evidence. Id. For the court's
discussion of its statutory obligation in disability determinations, see notes 70-76
and accompanying text supra.
98. For a discussion of Perales, the Supreme Court's most recent interpretation of the substantial evidence test in a disability proceeding, see notes
29-32 and accompanying text supra. See also R. DIxON, supra note 14, at
99-102. This commentator suggests that the Supreme Court decision in Perales
did little to clarify the substantial evidence rule since that issue was not directly
presented. Id. at 99. Dixon contends, however, that Perales is important
because it indicates the Court's disposition to support SSA's limited type of
hearing as consistent with due process. Id. at 102. Dixon also notes that the
decision "leaves open the future development of the substantial evidence
rule," and suggests that the degree to which that rule is actually followed by
the courts depends on "(a) judicial acceptance of the goals of the political
branches as embodied in the program, (b) the clarity of the statutory-administrative standards, and (c) the precision in administrative procedures and operational criteria for applying the standards." Id.
99. The Cotter court's reliance on SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80
(1943) seems misplaced since although the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the Commission's order because the grounds upon which the Commission acted could not be sustained, the Court was careful to emphasize that
it was "not enforcing formal requirements" on the administrative agency.
Id. at 94. For a further discussion of Chenery Corp., see notes 28 8C68 supra.
See also Cotter, 642 F.2d at 708 (Garth, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part). As noted by Judge Garth, this attitude by the Supreme Court that a
reviewing court may not graft its own notion of proper procedures upon an
administrative agency has recently been reiterated in Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978). In
Vermont Yankee, the Court emphasized that formulation of procedures governing administrative decisions is within the discretion of administrative agencies,
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substantial evidence test demonstrates that the test has not provided a
precise standard by which a reviewing court may comprehend its scope
of review in specific factual settings l

0

Nevertheless, it is contended that although the Cotter holding
lacks specific statutory or Supreme Court authorization, it is quite appropriate in light of the special nature of a disability benefits claim 101
and is consistent with the Secretary's intent to design procedures which
further uniformity in the determination of disability benefits. 1 02 The

Cotter court's insistence on having the ALJ set forth reasons for a
rejection of probative evidence seems, in essence, to be a response to
arbitrary decision making in the award of disability benefits. 103 It is
submitted that it is incumbent upon reviewing courts to insist on
strict judicial scrutiny of administrative action in disability proceedings in order to protect the fundamental personal interests of individual
claimants. 0 4 In furtherance of this goal, it is apposite for reviewing
courts to require administrative officers who are faced with conflicting
medical evidence to articulate the reasons for rejecting relevant eviand reviewing courts are not free to impose additional procedural requirements.
Id. at 525. For a further discussion of Judge Garth's opinion, see notes 86-91

and accompanying text supra.
100. Commentators have long noted the difficulty in applying the substantial evidence test. See K. DAVIS; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §29.11 (1959) (the
substantial evidence test is vague so that variations in intensity of review from
court to court and from case to case are considerable); R. DIXON, supra note
14, at 99 (the substantial evidence test is inherently imprecise as to the required evidentiary support for an administrative finding); B. SCHWARTZ, supra
note 28 §210 (there is often greater difficulty in applying the substantial
evidence test than in formulating it). "
101. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. at 399. The Perales Court stated
the need for disability proceedings to contain procedures that are both fair
and workable. For a discussion of Perales, see notes 29-32 and accompanying
text supra. For an acknowledgment by the Third Circuit that it has repeatedly
recognized the special nature of disability claims and, therefore, the need for
proportionately extra care in developing an administrative record, see note
61 and accompanying text supra.
For the views of other Circuits which have recognized the special need for
judicial protection in disability benefits cases, see notes 34, 38-48, 50-52 supra.
102. See R. DIXON, supra note 14, at 52. This writer noted that "[t]he
administrative regulations under the basic Congressional phrase-'inability to
engage in any gainful activity'-were designed . . . to introduce some
standardization, objectivity, and uniformity in proceedings on borderline disability claims on a national basis." Id.
103. See 642 F.2d at 706. The court expressed its frustration with the
AL's lack of reasoned findings and stated that "the ALJ's bare recital of the
boilerplate language that he 'carefully considered all the testimony . . . and
the exhibits' [is not] sufficient." Id. at 707 n.10.
104. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d
584 (D.C. Cir. 1971), where the court recognized that when administrative action
touches on fundamental personal interests, there is a special claim to judicial
protection. Id. For a more detailed discussion of this view, see note 34 supra.
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dence that supported the claim. 0 5 Moreover, it is contended that
strict judicial scrutiny and judicially imposed procedural requirements
regulating agency fact findings will remain a necessity as long as the
administrative process itself fails to confine and control the exercise
of administrative discretion. 0 6
The Cotter court's decision serves to expand the scope of judicial
review in a social security disability proceeding beyond prior Third
Circuit decisions, 107 and in application will compel lower courts in the
Third Circuit to remand decisions made by the Secretary which do not
conform to the new requirement that ALJ's explain their reasons for
rejecting evidence.' 08 It is suggested that the impact of such remands
will be to add to the significant backlog of cases that must be adjudicated in the Third Circuit by the Secretary, 09 and, thus, will further
delay the quick resolution of disability claims1 10 However, it is submitted that, with time, the need for remands may diminish since by
articulating the information it needs to conduct meaningful judicial
review, the court may actually have enhanced understanding between
the Secretary and the court."' Moreover, this elucidation of what is
required on the record will expedite the final resolution of applications for disability benefits by reducing the time needed by the court
to review the record and by reducing the need for remands to develop
105. For a discussion of the recent willingness by some circuits to impose
such additional requirements on the Secretary, see notes 34-64 and accompanying text supra.
106. It is submitted that some courts will continue to advocate a stricter
judicial scrutiny than the substantial evidence test would allow as long as
these courts perceive a void in administrative standards that govern their discretionary decisions. For a discussion of the recent trend of some courts to
demand stricter judicial scrutiny of administrative action, see note 35 and
accompanying text supra.
107. For the prior scope of judicial review of disability proceedings in
the Third Circuit, see notes 53-64 and accompanying text supra.
108. See 650 F.2d at 481 (1981) (Garth, J., dissenting from order denying
panel rehearing). Judge Garth expressed concern over the fact that the
majority opinion had already been relied upon by the District Court as a
basis for remanding several cases to the ALJ because the decisions did not
state reasons for rejecting evidence. Id. at 483 n.1, citing Burnett v. Harris,
No. 80-1790 (E.D. Pa. March 24, 1981); Summers v. Harris, No. 80-0512 (E.D.
Pa. March 24, 1981).
109. See 650 F.2d at 484. Judge Garth set forth the Secretary's caseload
statistics as follows: "Approximately 15,400 requests for a hearing before an

[ALJ] are currently pending in this Circuit, an average backlog of 234 cases
for each available [ALJ]." Id. at n.2.
110. Id. at 485. Judge Garth stated that the majority's decision in Cotter
would have a devastating impact on the workload at the SSA. Id.
111. See 650 F.2d at 482. The Cotter majority asserted that the ALJ
would now know what explanations should be made on the record to establish
an adequate basis for the reviewing court to perform its duty, and that this
would expedite, rather than obstruct the ultimate disposition of social security
cases. Id.
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a more adequate record. 112 Finally, it is arguable that the holding of
this case will ultimately lead to more equitable determinations as to
who is entitled to disability benefits, since it simultaneously requires
the Secretary to be more comprehensive in developing a reasoned
record and furnishes the court with an improved basis upon which
to exercise its review function." 8
Laurie A. Kramer
112. Id.
113. See note Ill and accompanying text supra,
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